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THE ROLE OF DEMANDABLE DEBT IN STRUCTURING OPTIMAL BANKING ARRANGEMENTS
For centuries the vast majority of externally financed investments have
been funded by banks, for which demandable debt instruments (bank notes and
checking accounts) have been the principal source of funds. The goal of this
paper is to explain the emergence of demandable-debt banking historically as
the primary means of external finance in the economy.
Demandable debt warrants explanation because in several respects it
appears more costly than available alternative contracting structures. By
issuing demandable debt, banks created a mismatch between the maturity of
assets and liabilities. This mismatch left them exposed to the possibility
that depositors would attempt to withdraw more funds than a bank could supply
on short notice. When this occurred, the consequences were costly.
Individual banks which did not meet their obligations were forced into
expensive procedures (liquidation or receivership) that would not have arisen
2
in an equity-based or maturity-matched contracting structure. If depositors
en masse attempted to withdraw funds from the entire banking system, banks as
a group were forced to suspend convertibility of their liabilities into specie
3
on demand. Such suspension was also disruptive and costly. To defend
against either of these undesirable consequences, banks had to hold a
proportion of their assets in idle reserves to insulate themselves from
excessive withdrawals.
Given these costs, demandable debt seems inferior to both
maturity-matched debt and equity contracting. However, in this paper we show
that demandable debt has an important advantage as part of an incentive scheme
for disciplining the banker. In effect, demandable debt permits depositors to
"vote with their feet"; withdrawal of funds is a vote of no-confidence in the
activities of the banker. Without the ability to make early withdrawals
depositors would have little incentive to monitor the bank. The ease with
which banks may be forced into liquidation, far from being an unfortunate
consequence of the contracting structure, turns out to be central to the
structure: we show that by submitting to the threat of liquidation under
appropriate circumstances the banker can reduce his cost of capital.
L. EXPLANATIONS FOR DEMANDABLE DEBT
Recent theoretical work on the role of banks has tended to divide into
two categories. One category emphasizes the role of banks as providing
flexibility for depositors in the timing of consumption. The other category,
to which our paper belongs, emphasizes the incentive problem inherent in the
4
•divergence of interest between a bank's depositors and its managers. For
reasons indicated below, we believe that accounts which ignore the incentive
problem facing the banker do not adequately explain why banks historically
settled on demandable debt.
Liquidity Explanations for Demandable Debt
In the past several years, the preeminent theoretical analyses of banks,
bank runs, and bank regulation have assumed that the economic role of
demandable debt is to provide liquidity to risk averse depositors who are
uncertain about the timing of their future consumption demand.
In this category of models, bank runs, when they occur, are an
unfortunate and undesirable side-effect of a contract whose whole purpose is
to provide liquidity. In consequence, these papers and successive papers in
the area have gone on to examine the role of government regulation in
eliminating bank runs, and the possibility that other private arrangements
might exist which would provide liquidity without the undesirable side effect.
These models provide a concise formalization of the fact that banks
provide transactions flexibility and a coherent account of bank runs. But
because they ignore the incentive problem facing the banker, they are unable
to account for several important institutional features of demandable debt.
First of all, the major consequence of a run on an individual bank was to
place the bank into receivership. If the major cost of a bank failure was the
inability of demanders to receive timely payments, then it is paradoxical that
liquidations were associated with long delays in access to bank assets by
creditors. Historically, bank loans were of short duration (typically, a
matter of months). If rapid access to assets had been the goal, a mechanism
that simply prevented banks from making new loans until all depositors had
been paid off would have been superior to putting banks into receivership.
Second, in the absence of incentive constraints on the part of the
banker, the optimal arrangement in liquidity-based accounts always involves
suspension of convertibility rather than expensive liquidation. But
suspension was not an option available to individual banks; it was only an
alternative for the financial-system as a whole, in the face of system-wide
panics. Individual banks that could not satisfy creditors' fears about
solvency were not permitted to suspend; they were forced to close.
Third, studies of actual bank failures give fraud a prominent place in
the list of causes. For example, Smead finds, in his study of bank failures
in the 1920s, that three of the nine most common causes of bank failure
involve fraudulent or questionable activities by the banker: loans to
officers and directors, outright defalcation, and loans to enterprises in
which officers and directors were interested. Studies of nineteenth century
banking indicate that fraud and conflicts of interest characterize the vast
g
majority of bank failures for state and nationally chartered banks.
Finally, receivership resulted from a critical mass of depositor
withdrawal orders, and was invoked because of information about bank asset
values, not because of exogenous liquidity needs of individual depositors. In
cases of massive exogenous demand for an individual bank's assets by small
depositors, banks avoided failure by appealing to other banks for loans of
reserves; however when large informed depositors (including other bankers)
concluded that a bank was in trouble, they would precipitate a run, depleting
9
the bank's reserves and forcing it to be placed in receivership.
These considerations make it apparent that the liquidation of banks --
which was part and parcel of demandable-debt contracts -- was designed to
place the assets of banks beyond the reach of the banker. The rationale for
prohibiting banks from suspending at their own discretion may be the
discipline that it imposed on the behavior of the banker. Thus a model of
demandable debt with bank liquidation through receivership should account for
the desirability of taking control of the bank away from the banker at the
option of depositors.
The "sequential service constraint" (first-come first -serve rule) for
bank withdrawals, which allowed informed depositors to receive repayment
before banks were placed into receivership also warrants explanation. In
cases other than banking, payments of bankrupt firms to creditors in
anticipation of bankruptcy are not allowed, and creditors may be forced to
relinquish such payments during the bankruptcy proceeding. Why in the case of
banking should those who run the bank first receive preferential treatment in
liquidation states?
Demandable Debt as an Incentive Scheme
The second category of models of the role of banks begins with the
assumption that bankers have an informational advantage in determining which
projects are most worthy of financing. Therefore the banker has a comparative
advantage in allocating funds for investment, but he also may have the ability
. . , ~
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to act against the interests of uninformed depositors.
We show that demandable debt can provide an incentive-compatible solution
to this problem in the presence of costly information. The right to take
one's money out of the bank if one becomes suspicious that realized returns
are low makes it in the depositor's interest to keep an eye on the bank. If
enough depositors agree with this negative assessment of the bank's future,
liquidation will be called for and the bank will close. The demandable debt
contract allows the banker to pre-commit to a set of payoffs he otherwise
would not be able to offer depositors.
Not all depositors need monitor the banker. We argue that the first-come
first-serve ("sequential service") rule of demandable debt provides
compensation for those who choose to invest in information and thus avoids
free-riding. We view bank intermediation, therefore, as a three-sided
relationship. The monitors pay the costs of vigilance, but receive the
benefit of knowing that they will be "first in line" (and thereby receive a
higher payment than other depositors) should it become necessary to withdraw
their funds from the bank. The depositors who do not monitor are willing to
pay the price of being last in line in "bad" states, because they receive a
benefit in return: the active monitors keep the banker in line and thereby
provide a benefit to the passive depositors. Depositors need not reveal
12
whether they are active or passive -- the same contract works for both types.
The physical structure we assume includes the following important
features: (1) The bank is operated by a monopolist with special access to a
profitable investment opportunity which yields either a good or a bad
realization. (2) There is potential for cheating by the banker which takes the
form of his absconding with a proportion of the bank's assets after the
investment realization. (One can think of this more generally as costly ex
post fraudulent behavior which the banker undertakes whenever it is more
profitable to do so than to make the promised payments to" depositors). (3)
Depositors face different costs of obtaining a signal which allows them to
predict profitability. (4) An authority exists who will enforce contracts
(some of which may stipulate conditions for bank liquidation) and who can act
as receiver for liquidated banks. (5) Depositors have a reservation level of
return on their endowments below which they will not invest funds with the
banker.
The profit maximizing banker will act to maximize social gain by
selecting a contract that achieves beneficial intermediation (investment in
profitable enterprises) , while avoiding as much as possible the costs
associated with absconding or liquidating. We find that the deraandable debt
contract is optimal for a range of parameter values. The potential for costly
liquidation may be more than offset by the social gain which comes from
enhanced investment opportunities.
It is useful to place these results in the context of two related papers.
13
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) provide an example of an information-based run
for a model which has many features in common with ours. In their account,
banks provide deraandable debt in a risk neutral environment. Individuals
obtain private information regarding the solvency of the bank. Runs are based
14
on this information.
One important difference between their formulation and ours is the fact
that they assume an (exogenously imposed) negative externality from
liquidation of the bank's assets. Therefore when individual depositors choose
to run the bank, non-runners suffer in the process. Since there are no
incentive problems on the part of the banker, suspension of convertibility
always improves the outcome. Thus the creation of a liquidation technology is
not efficient in their model.
Chari and Jagannathan recognize that their model: is designed to
investigate bank runs, not to justify the existence of banks. In our model,
there is a positive externality from running the bank: when the depositor
observes a bad signal, he calls for liquidation, thereby salvaging some of the
bank's value. The bank's structure is designed to internalize this positive
externality, and allow non-monitoring depositors to compensate monitors for
the benefits they provide. Because of this monitoring function, runs on the
bank in our model provide social benefits, rather than social costs.
Bernanke and Gertler (1987) provide a simple macroeconomic model in
which bankers are subject to moral hazard and depositors desire liquidity.
Because of the moral hazard problem, bank owners must invest their own assets
in the bank; there is a limit to the amount of deposits that they can obtain.
Because of the lack of information about the profitability of projects, only
debt contracts are incentive compatible; because depositors desire liquidity,
demandable debt is best. Bernanke and Gertler explicitly assume that costly
monitoring and punishment of defaulting bankers are not possible; therefore in
their model there is no room for shutting down banks that fail to pay
depositors on demand. In effect this means that the only possible debt
contracts are those in which payments are low enough that default occurs with
probability zero: the bank's equity must be sufficient to make this guarantee
possible.
Our model demonstrates the gains to be had from allowing the demandable
debt contracts to be less than certain, and use of costly monitoring to
reduce the danger of malfeasance on the part of the banker. In this case,
demandable debt becomes desirable even in the absence of liquidity demand. It
also explains the usefulness of the sequential service constraint in banking,
giving preferential treatment to the depositors who are first to request
redemption. :
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
demonstrates the value of a demandable debt contract in the case of a single
investor contracting with the banker monopolist. Here a run corresponds to a
demand by the investor for liquidation of the bank. Section III examines the
case where different monitors receive different (i.i.d.) signals. In this
case it pays to have more than one depositor monitoring the bank, because the
quality of signals in the aggregate improves with the number of monitors.
Banks find it advantageous to hold reserves, as well as to make loans, because
the reserves provide a buffer that allows banks to reduce the likelihood of
unwarranted liquidation. An optimal threshold of withdrawal orders is chosen
at which the bank is liquidated, and relative payoffs ensure that the optimal
number of monitors invest in receiving signals.
The final section offers some perspectives on our results. We consider
several limitations inherent in our approach. In addition we briefly and
informally indicate how solving the incentive problem facing the banker will
also make the banker's liabilities more transactable . Formal models combining
the incentive problem and the issue of transactability are an important field
for further research.
II. THE MODEL WITH A SINGLE DEPOSITOR
Physical Structure
A banker has an opportunity available to him as an investment. However
he lacks sufficient capital to take advantage of the opportunity. The
investment opportunity costs one dollar. Each potential depositor has one
dollar to invest. We will let S represent the total expected return
available for a dollar's investment elsewhere in the economy. We assume
all agents are risk neutral; thus any scheme the banker develops will have to
yield a depositor that same expected return.
The investment opportunity yields an uncertain payoff which may take one
of two values T.. or T„ , with T_ > T.. . The probability of the high outcome is
7. The realization is unknown by all parties at the outset, and is observable
ex post only by the banker. Thus there is no way to make a contract tied
directly to the value of T.. (This analysis extends naturally to the case
where T has a continuous distribution)
.
Let period 3 be the date at which the payoff is realized and the loan is
to be repaid. We assume that in period 3, immediately before repayment, the
banker has the opportunity to abscond with the funds. Absconding is socially
wasteful -- for concreteness we will assume it reduces the realization T. by
1 J
the proportion A, where A is between zero and one.
Although the act of absconding reduces the size of the pie that is
divided between the banker and the depositor, it places the banker beyond the
reach of the law. Therefore he is no longer constrained to repay the loan as
initially promised. Thus any promise to pay the depositor an amount P is
actually an option of the banker either to pay P, or to leave town with his
assets diminished by the proportion A.
The losses from absconding may be interpreted in a variety of ways. They
may represent the cost of engaging in fraud (payments to co-conspirators) or
the costs (foregone earnings) of placing the bank's resources in a form that
allows theft. The latter interpretation requires a richer, multiperiod model
than the one we provide, in which bankers allocation decisions depend on last
period earnings.
It should be readily apparent that the temptation to abscond will be
greater with lower realizations of T. . In deciding whether to abscond, the
banker compares the "tax" on absconding AT. with the promised funds due the
depositor. If the absconding tax is less, then absconding is more profitable
than paying up. Historical evidence confirms the greater prevalence of fraud
in times of low returns to bank investments.
Because of the threat that the banker has of absconding -- a threat
against which he cannot commit himself -- it will generally be necessary for
the banker to increase the payment offered to a depositor by a "default
premium" as protection against those states in which the depositor will in
fact receive nothing.
Note that the addition of a default premium can in turn increase the
probability of default, by making it desirable for the banker to abscond in
good states as well. For example, suppose
S > AT.
so that any payment promised to the depositor must be sufficiently large so as
to incur absconding in the low realization -- that is, a promise to pay P will
be honored no more than 7 of the time. Suppose also that
7T
2
+ (1- 7 )(1-A)T
1
> S
so that the investment would be socially desirable (even taking into account
the loss from absconding in the low realization) . Then if
S > 7AT
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there is no way to promise the depositor enough expected payment to make him
willing to invest, despite the social desirability of the project; the
promised payment would have to exceed AT-, making it desirable for the banker
to abscond all the time.
Because of the loss of socially desirable opportunities, it is useful to
have a method of thwarting absconding. One such method is the liquidation of
the bank in period 2. Liquidation means that the bank's assets are taken over
by a receiver, controlled by a court. This is an expensive process, not the
least because the court-appointed and -controlled receiver is likely to be
less able to realize the full potential of the assets. On the other hand, the
fact that the assets are no longer in the banker's control preempts any
decision by him to abscond with the funds.
We assume that liquidation reduces the value of the assets by the
proportion L, so that L can be regarded as the tax due to liquidation. For a
complete characterization of the process of liquidation, it is necessary to
take some stand as to the maximum that can be feasibly paid to the depositor
18
in the case of liquidation. We call this value M, and we assume that
AT > M > AT (1)
so that the amount that can be guaranteed to the depositor in a liquidating
contract is greater than the maximum amount that can be guaranteed in a
non- liquidating contract. We also assume that
L < A (2)
19
so that liquidation is less wasteful socially than is absconding.
In some cases it may be desirable always to put the assets of the bank
into liquidation rather than risk the banker's absconding. We call such an
agreement a "simple liquidation contract", as opposed to a "simple
non- liquidation contract" which states a promised repayment and leaves it to
11
the banker to abscond or not.
The more interesting case however, is one in which the depositor, based
on his own information, is given the option of demanding liquidation or not.
Specifically, suppose that by paying a cost I the depositor is able to
receive a signal a in period 1 as to the likelihood of a high (T_) or low (T )
realization. The action of investing in the signal, and the result are
private. The signal a works as follows: It takes on one of two values (g, b)
20(for "good" and "bad"). The probability of a high realization, contingent on
the signal is p ;
P > 7 > P, (3)
g b
We will use the indicator variable e G (0,1) to represent the depositor's
choice: e - 1 if there was an investment in the signal, otherwise.
In summary, the physical structure of our model is as follows: There are
three periods. In period 1 the depositor may invest in receiving a signal. In
period 2 the bank may be liquidated. In period 3, the loan is repaid to the
depositor, unless the banker decides to abscond (which he can only do if the
bank has not been liquidated.)
The Contracting Structure
Contracts are arranged in period zero. The monopolist banker offers the
profit maximizing contract among those which yield the depositor at least S in
expected returns. (If no such contract exists, or the best such contract
yields negative profits, then none is offered).
The universe of contracts in this structure is as follows: A contract is
a function from a space of announcements 2 into outcomes . An outcome is a pair
(P,A), where A
€ {0,1} is an indicator variable equaling 1 if liquidation is
mandated and otherwise. P is the mandated repayment. (Of course P will only
12
21
be received if Che banker does not abscond)
.
If the contract only specifies one outcome, we'll call it a "simple
contract." Otherwise we call it a "compound contract." We have already
described the two kinds of simple contracts -- the simple liquidating contract
and the simple non- liquidating contract. A straightforward application of the
revelation principle demonstrates that for the single depositor case,
contracts need never contain more than two outcomes because the signal the
depositor may observe has only two values. We can identify the announcements
in a compound contract with assertions by the depositor that he has observed
one or the other signal. Thus a compound contract consists of a quartet
<WVV-
Each contract generates a sequential game in which the depositor chooses
the level of investment in information gathering e and the announcement he
makes as a function of the signal he receives. The banker chooses whether to
abscond as a function of the announcement made by the depositor and the
realization on the investment. An optimal contract is one for which there is
a sequential equilibrium which generates maximum profits consistent with the
depositor's receiving expected returns equal to the amount S.
Theorem 1: The optimal contract in the problem takes one of the following four
forms:
a. A, simple non- liquidating contract.
b. A simple liquidating contract. In this case,
AT < P < M. (4.b)
c. A compound contract composed of two simple non- liquidating contracts. (\.~
A - 0) . In this case
g
P, < AT. and AT. < P < AT.. (4.c)
b 1 1 g 2
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d. A compound contract composed of one simple liquidating contract and one
simple non-liquidating contract. (A,- 1; A - 0) . In this case
AT. < P, < P < AT- . (4.d)log 2
If the optimal contract is a compound contract, then the depositor
invests in the signal; if it is a simple contract he does not. In the case of
compound contracts, absconding occurs if and only if the signal was g but the
low value outcome T. was realized.
We'll call contract d "demandable debt." It works as follows: After
making the deposit the depositor invests in learning what the likely outcome
will be. If he receives the bad signal, he opts for the simple liquidating
contract. This delivers a payment with certainty. If he receives the good
signal he opts for the non- liquidating contract. This promises a higher
payment but runs the risk of the banker's absconding.
Contract c works in virtually the same way. The only difference is that
the guaranteed payment in the case of a bad signal is sufficiently low that
the banker will never wish to abscond and so it is not necessary to use
liquidation to hold him in place. Since liquidation always involves social
costs, it is not difficult to demonstrate that in any case where contract c is
feasible, it dominates contract d. We will (with prejudice) describe contract
c as a "nuisance contract."
Next we provide a characterization of when the various contracts will
be observed. We do so under the assumption that the signal is "accurate"
(that is
, p is high and p, is low, so that the signal is a good predictor of
the state) and the signal is "cheap" (so that I is small). It is easily
demonstrated that if the signal is sufficiently inaccurate or sufficiently
expensive, a compound contract is not useful.
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Theorem 2: If the signal is sufficiently cheap and accurate, then there
exist values S , S, such that the optimal contract depends on the required
returns S in the following way: For S < AT., the simple, non- liquidating
contract is optimal. For S G (AT., S ], the nuisance contract is optimal. For
S E (S
,
S] ,demandable debt is optimal. For S > S, no contract is feasible.
In other words, demandable debt will be observed when the returns that
depositors can receive in alternate investments is relatively high. Precise
bounds for "sufficiently accurate" and "sufficiently cheap" are provided in
the proof in the appendix.
III. MULTIPLE DEPOSITORS WITH INDEPENDENT SIGNALS
In this section we develop a model for the case in which a number of
depositors enter into contracts with the banker. As before, each depositor
has $1 to invest, and the banker has one "project" he can pursue The project
costs Y and yields a total return of YT.
,
which takes one of two values. Any
deposits the banker receives in excess of Y can be used to yield the same
competitive return S that depositors have available to them on their own.
Deposits in excess of Y will be identified with "reserves."
We make the following natural assumptions about the difference between
the two forms of bank assets, "project" and "reserves":
If the bank is liquidated, the value of the project decreases by the
22proportion L; the value of the reserves are unchanged.
If the banker absconds then he takes the projects with him and receives
23(l-A)YT.. The depositors retain the entirety of the reserves. We strengthen
assumption (2) as follows:
L < AC^/Tj) (5)
15
There are Z individuals available to enter into a contract with the bank.
Of these individuals, K can receive signals by investing at a cost I; for the
24
remainder, the cost of receiving a signal is prohibitive. Signals are i.i.d.
conditional on T. . For any individual a "bad" signal is associated with
reduced likelihood of the high productivity state, so, p < p as before.
Supposing that all K individuals have invested in the signal, let N be
the number who receive the "bad" realization. Given the
:
i.i.d, structure,
N is a sufficient statistic for T., and the probability that the realization
is T_ decreases with N.
The Contract from the Banker' s Viewpoint
We start by examining only the incentive problem for the banker, taking
the behavior of all depositors as given. We will return to the individual
depositors' incentives in the succeeding section. For now, we assume that all
K individuals who can invest in obtaining the information do so and report it
25
truthfully. A contract specifies an aggregate payment P and a liquidation
decision A as functions of the number of depositors who announce observations
of the bad signal. (In the subsequent section we will investigate a scheme
for dividing aggregate payments among the depositors). Note therefore that
the contract is the direct generalization of the contract in the previous
section to a case of multiple signals.
After the announcement of the signals, the game tree is as before: if a
liquidation is not mandated, the banker makes a decision whether to abscond.
The following table describes the payoffs on each of the three nodes of the
game tree:
16
Banker Receives Depositors Receive
Liquidation: (l-L)T.Y + (Z-Y)S - P P
No Liquidation
Banker Absconds: (l-A)T.Y (Z-Y)S
Banker does not T.Y + (Z-Y)S - P P
Abscond:
The optimal contract maximizes the banker's expected profits subject to
three restrictions:
1) The expected payments to the depositors equal their aggregate
reservation level:
SZ + KI
-- tha-t is, all depositors must be compensated for the opportunity cost of
their funds; in addition, any monitors must be compensated for the cost of
"monitoring.
2) In the case of liquidation, actual payment cannot exceed what is
assumed feasible; as before we suppose that a liquidated investment Y pays off
at most MY to the depositors. Thus the total payment to depositors out of the
project and the reserves is
P < MY + (Z-Y)S if A - 1.
3) Finally we must consider the banker's incentive to abscond. If
liquidation does not occur, then the banker will prefer to abscond whenever
AT.Y < P - (Z-Y)S.
l
If the inequality is reversed the banker prefers not to abscond.
A
As before, we define S to be the least upper bound of feasible expected
returns to depositors from the project; if the required rate of return exceeds
S, no contract is feasible. The appendix calculates S explicitly.
Our first result is that for required returns which are sufficiently
17
high, (but less than S), the optimal contract calls for liquidation when the
number of bad signals is high, and not when the number of bad signals is low.
When the number of bad signals is low, there is a positive (but small)
probability that the banker will abscond.
Theorem 3." for an interval of values of S (S, S], the optimal contract
has the following form: there exists N such that
If N > N, A(N) - 1 and P(N) - MY + (Z-Y)S
If N < N, A(N) - and P(N) - AT Y + (Z-Y)S
In other words, the contract has informed agents announce whether their
signal was bad. If more than a critical number N announce bad signals, the
bank is liquidated. If fewer than N announce bad signals the bank is not
liquidated, and the banker chooses to abscond if the productivity draw was
i
26
low.
Note that Z is arbitrary in this contract. As Z increases the optimal P
increases one-for-one: additional deposits beyond those invested in the
27
project are held in reserves and returned to the depositors with certainty.
Depositor Incentives
It remains to be shown that the total aggregate payment to depositors
specified in the previous section can be divided among depositors in such a
way as to maintain the incentives for low cost information depositors to
invest in the signal, and to report it truthfully. In this section we derive
a demandable debt contract which achieves this goal.
We make the following assumptions about the population of monitors and
the signals:
18
Distributional assumptions
;
There are large numbers of potential depositors
Z and potential monitors K. The cost of monitoring I is small. The
probability of any one monitor receiving a bad signal is small. The
probability of a bad realization of T is small (although the losses can be
large)
.
In modeling a bank, each of these assumptions seems to us natural. The
assumptions allow us to model the distribution of the number: of bad signals as
a Poisson distribution. More precise criteria for "small enough" or "large
enough" are indicated in the appendix.
Note that as long as I is sufficiently small, it is always optimal to
have all the potential monitors engage in investment.
The contract for all depositors is identical. Ex post depositors will
pick one of two announcements within the contract. Since there are three
information possibilities: observing "g"
,
observing "b" or not making an
investment, there will have to be some pooling in the outcomes. We will build
a contract in which it is incentive compatible for the depositors who have
made no investment to pool with those who have observed the good draw.
Each depositor's payoff depends on his announcement and the signal (if
any) he observes. We let the symbol EU(ct,ct) denote the expected return for a
A
depositor who observes signal a and announces signal a.
Individual depositors are subject to two sorts of constraints:
participation constraints (i.e., the contract must give expected returns which
are sufficient for depositors to participate) and incentive constraints. From
the point of view of the individual depositors the contract must satisfy the
following requirements:
1) Always announcing "g" gives an expected return of S, which exceeds
the expected return from always announcing "b." This means that depositors
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with high costs of gathering information will be willing to participate in the
contract in the manner specified.
2) Announcing the observation truthfully gives a return of S + I, which
exceeds the return from lying. If conditions in 1 are satisfied as well, then
individuals with cost of I for investing are willing to make the investment in
monitoring and report truthfully.
These constraints for individual depositors can be written as follows:AAA /V
AEU(g.g) + (l-A)EU(g.b) - S > AEU(b.g) + (1-A) EU(b,b)
A A A A
AEU(g,g) + (l-A)EU(b.b) - S + I > AEU(b.g) + (l-A)EU(g.b)
where A is the prior probability of signal g.
The scheme we consider has payments of a particularly simple form: Any
depositor announcing "b" receives the payment R with certainty. We can call
an announcement "b" a "withdrawal of funds." If more than N depositors
announce "b" the bank is liquidated; otherwise it is not, and the banker has
the option of absconding. In any event, those depositors who do not announce
"b" evenly split the aggregate payment to depositors described in the
previous section, less the funds withdrawn. We call this scheme a "standard
demandable debt contract."
Under a standard demandable debt contract, of course,
A A
EU(b.b) - EU(b,g) - R.
However, for depositors who do not withdraw their funds the payment depends on
the number of depositors N who do withdraw, and on whether the banker
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absconds. The following table describes the payments for a depositor who
announces "g":
Payoff to depositor who announces "g" if
number of depositors announcing "b" is
And project
realization is
Less than N Greater than N
AT„ + (Z-Y)S - RN
1
Z-N MY + (Z-Y)S -. RN
Z-N
(Z-Y)S • RN
Z-N
For example, if more than N depositors withdraw funds, then the bank
is liquidated and according to the contract, the total payment to depositors
P is MY + (Z-Y)S; that quantity, less the withdrawn deposits RN is split among
the remaining depositors Z-N, yielding the quantity in the rightmost column of
the table. The remaining numbers are calculated in a similar fashion.
Given the probabilities of the realizations of T., and the probability of
L
each signal contingent on T. it is a straightforward matter to
calculate EU(g,b) and EU(g.g).
participation constraints reduce to the following:
For this scheme, the incentive and
28
EU(g.b) - R - I/(l-A)
S > R
In the appendix we demonstrate that when an aggregate contract of the
sort described in the previous section is optimal, it can always be
implemented with a deraandable debt scheme:
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Theorem 4: Under the distributional assumptions and the conditions of the
previous theorem, the optimal outcome can be achieved with a simple demandable
debt contract.
The role of reserves in our model warrants discussion. By holding
reserves the bank is able to guarantee early payment to a small number of
monitors (those who receive bad signals) without forcing the' bank to be placed
into receivership. Reserves allow the bank to commit to the sequential
service constraint (early withdrawals by those who run the bank) , which
supports the implementation of the contract between bankers and depositors.
More familiar justifications for bank reserve holding includethe usefulness of
reserves in meeting stochastic demands for conversion into gold (say, due to
foreign transactions needs of depositors) , or the contribution of reserves to
"an optimally diversified portfolio of bank assets. Our model adds to these
transactions and portfolio motivations for holding reserves an
" incentive -compatibility" demand for reserves.
III. SUMMARY . EXTENSIONS. AND LIMITATIONS
Summary
We have argued that historical demandable -debt banking can be
understood as the optimal means of incentive-compatible intermediation in an
environment of asymmetric information with potential for fraudulent behavior
on the part of the banker. Monitoring by some depositors, and runs by
monitors who receive bad signals, ensure sufficiently high payoffs to
depositors in states of the world which would otherwise lead to malfeasance by
the banker.
Agency problems are inherent in banking. Depositors entrust their
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endowments to bankers, who decide how to invest them, and have essentially
unfettered immediate control over the depositors' funds. We capture this
agency problem in a simple way by allowing the potential for "absconding" by
the banker. The banker has the ability to remove funds from the bank.
Absconding is socially wasteful; if the banker steals funds from the bank he
uses a "leaky bucket," so that the amount he actually receives is less than
the amount stolen.
If the required return for depositors is sufficiently high, then the
banker may find it attractive to abscond rather than make the promised payment
to depositors. Anticipating this, depositors will be unwilling to entrust
their funds to the banker, and efficient intermediation will not take place.
In other words, the possibility for a banker to abscond may make it difficult
for him to attract depositors to his bank.
We introduce a liquidation technology that allows depositors, at a cost,
to prevent the banker from absconding, and makes it possible for the banker to
attract depositors. We show that under some circumstances the optimal
arrangement has the depositor choose whether to liquidate the bank, contingent
on a costly signal he receives. In good states, it will pay for the banker
not to abscond and to pay the depositor as promised; in bad states, absent a
liquidation announcement, the banker will abscond rather than pay as promised.
Thus when monitors receive bad signals they call for liquidation.
If the signal is perfect and costless to the depositor, liquidation would
only occur when there are bad loan investment realizations. If the signal is
imperfect and costly, but not prohibitively so, it still makes sense to use
the contingent liquidation contract, even though on occasion monitoring
depositors may make errors in judging when to "run the bank," and force the
bank to liquidate unnecessarily. Banks can fail either because the banker
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absconds, or because the depositor initiates a run on the bank. The purpose
of a run is to prevent absconding from taking place.
In the case of multiple depositors, the bank uses reserves to offer
guaranteed payments to early withdrawers, and to insulate itself from a few
bad idiosynchratic signals. At the same time, under circumstances that
probably would lead to costly absconding, depositors as a group are likely to
order liquidation preemptively. The number of monitors and the threshold at
which a bank liquidation is called for will be chosen optimally to minimize
total expected costs of liquidation, absconding, and monitoring.
Trans actabilitv as a Motivation for Demandable Debt
Thus far we have argued that demandable debt intermediation may arise in
order to permit profitable investment opportunities to be realized. In our
•models, there is no demand for transactability ; therefore assets are valued
entirely based on expected return. An important feature of demandable debt
instruments historically, however, has been their use as a medium of exchange.
In this section we briefly consider the implications of our model for the
liquidity of demandable debt.
It is important to note from the outset that transactable instruments
need not be demandable. Post-dated bills of exchange and post-dated bank
notes were physically transactable instruments that existed in the nineteenth
century in the United States (Dewey 1910) . Their primary difference from
demandable debt was that they could be redeemed, not on demand, but only on
the date of maturity. Since such instruments could be maturity matched, they
would seem to have none of the disadvantages of demandable debt. Nonetheless,
demandable debt out-competed these as a medium of exchange.
In order to explain the relative liquidity of demandable debt one must
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explain why the ability to redeem a bank note or deposit on demand makes
people more willing to accept it as a means of payment. We argue that under
demandable debt, monitors and non-monitors alike are better informed of the
market value of the debt instrument at all times.
The fact that "the bank is open" (that monitors have not called for a
liquidation) is revealing to non-monitors. In the simplest, one-monitor case,
the fact that the bank is open is fully revealing because the signal that the
monitor receives takes one of two values. In the multi -monitor case, the fact
that the bank is open is not fully revealing; it only indicates that fewer
than the threshold number of bad signals have been announced. Even this
information, however, places a lower bound on the value of the bank's
29liability. If the liquidity of an asset depends on the extent to which
information about its value is shared, then one would expect demandable debt
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to have been more liquid than other contracts with which it competed. Thus
it may be possible to view the liquidity of bank claims as a by-product of the
solution to the agency problem.
While we argue that the transactability of demandable debt enhanced its
attractiveness, it is interesting to note that demandable debt banking
pre-dates the transactability of demandable debt. Thus the desirability of
demandable debt contracting does not seem to have depended crucially on the
transactability of the instruments. For example, historians of the Roman
banking panic of 33 A.D. point out the importance of demandable debt in
causing massive bank disintermediation. Roman banks, however, did not issue
31transactable claims like modern bank notes and checks.
The "liquidity premium" which demandable debt enjoys can be included into
our framework by reducing the level of the required return S on demandable
debt by the amount of the liquidity premium. In other words, demandable debt
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would face a lower threshold reservation level to satisfy than the
non- liquidating compound contract. This implies an expansion of the parameter
values for which demandable debt is preferred to the "nuisance" contract.
It may appear paradoxical that the most illiquid assets in the economy
(those which require information- intensive bank intermediation) back the most
liquid liabilities. According to our model the answer to this paradox lies in
the common information which monitors generate regarding the value of a
demandable -debt contract. Thus even though bank assets may be more difficult
to appraise, and may be appraised less exactly, the form of a demandable -debt
contract makes it relatively liquid.
In other words, the answer to the puzzle of why banks use the most
illiquid assets in the economy to back the most liquid liabilities can be
traced to the fact that demandable debt simultaneously solves the agency
problem of financial intermediation, and the asymmetric information problem of
asset transactions. The economies of scope between financing information-
intensive projects and providing liquidity may explain why banks out-competed
other intermediaries in providing small denomination liquid assets.
Limitations of the Analysis
It is worth noting some of the important limitations of our
framework. First, our goal is to explain the historic importance of
demandable debt in banking. In today's more regulated environment, where for
example, regulations on clearing through the Federal Reserve System has
favored demandable debt instruments, and where deposit insurance makes
depositor monitoring less important, demandable debt may persist simply as an
artefact of regulation.
Second, our method in arguing for the disciplinary role of demandable
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debt is to show that a demandable debt contract is an optimal arrangement in
specific environments. In general this could not possibly be the case; the
truly optimal arrangement in most general situations exceeds in complexity
anything ever observed in actual economies. Our ability to devise extremely
complicated arrangements in models exceeds our ability to devise
correspondingly complicated arrangements in real life, perhaps because the
transactions costs of designing and implementing such . arrangements are
prohibitive. Our claim for the optimality of demandable debt is more modest:
The use of demadable debt helps in solving an incentive problem that arises
for real banks. It is also an extremely simple contract. In the situations
examined here it in fact achieves the optimum possible under all allocations.
In more complex situations it does well even if some extremely complicated
alternatives might do somewhat better.
Third, our account is one of individual banks and individual bank
liquidations, not of systems of banks or systemic crises. We are dealing with
bank runs, not economy-wide bank panics. We are only attempting to model the
operation of demandable debt in normal times, when the rules required banks to
pay on demand. In historical practice, the provisions of demandable debt,
32including liquidation, were suspended during crisis. That is to say,
demandable debt was a contingent rule; it required banks to meet the threat
of runs in response to idiosyncratic problems; but it allowed banks to escape
convertibility on demand in the face of systemic disturbances. Only
individual bank difficulties led to placing a bank in receivership.
Suspension and interbank relations during panics are important as well, but
doing this topic justice requires a larger analysis than the one we undertake
33in this paper.
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APPENDIX
To make the proofs more concise we will make the following modifications
to the structure without loss of generality. First we can treat the choice of
e - as generating a "signal" which is pure noise. Let p(o,e) be the
posterior probability of the high realization given an investment e and the
receipt of signal a. Then :
p(o , e) - p ife-1
a
- 7 if e - 0.
From this we can generate expectations as functions of a and e.
A contract is a quartet (A,
,
P, ,A ,P ) with the restriction that P < M if
o b g g a
A - 1. We can identify simple contracts with quartets (A.
,
P,
,
A
,
P ) in
a j r i T> b g g
which A, - A and P, - P . Finally, by the revelation principle, we can
A
restrict attention to contracts in which the announcement o(o) — a in
equilibrium.
The choice of a contract generates a game in which the depositor picks a
strategy consisting of investment and announcement (e, o(a) ) and the banker
picks a probability of absconding as a function of the depositor's
announcement and the realization of T. : a(a,T.). (Let a - 1 indicate
absconding, and a - indicate no absconding).
The banker's equilibrium strategy can be described simply:
a - 1 if A - and P > AT,
,
a a i
- if A - and P < AT. .
a a i
Let the function U(a,a) represent the expected profits of the depositor
A.
conditional on his observation a and on his announcement a. Then
U(a,a) - P A if A A - 1
a a
- P*(l - E(a(P
a
,T
i
)|a,e}) ifA^-0.
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Lemma : An optimal contract generates an equilibrium with e - if and only
if the contract is a simple contract.
Proof: If e - in equilibrium, then
A A
U(a,g) - U(a,b)
because the signal conveys no information. Thus
U(g,g) - U(b,g) - U(g,b) - U(b,b) ;
otherwise the contract would not induce truth- telling. If : the depositor is
indifferent between announcements, but the banker is not, then the contract is
sub-optimal, because banker profits could be improved by having the depositor
always make the announcement the banker prefers.
Thus both depositor and banker must be indifferent between the stated
outcomes for the two announcements. This requires the outcomes themselves to
be identical.
The converse follows from the next lemma. Define A to be the
probability of observing the signal g, so that
A
- (7 - Pb ) / (P g
" Ph )
Lemma: A contract generates an equilibrium with e = L if and only if
A A
U(b,b) - U(g,b) > I/(l-A) (A.l)
A A
U(g,g) - U(b.g) > I/A (A. 2)
Proof: If the depositor does not make the investment in the signal, he has the
following options: he could always report that the signal was g; he could
always report that the signal was b; or he could make a randomization. In
equilibrium, e - 1 if and only if all of these strategies are dominated by the
strategy in which the depositor makes the investment and reports the signal
truthfully, that is, if and only if
A A A A
* U(g.g) + (1-A) U(b,b) - I > A U(g,g) + (1-A) U(g,b)
A A A A
A U(g,g) + (1-A) U(b,b) - I > A U(b,g) + (1-A) U(b,b)
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These two inequalities simplify to those in the statement of the lemma.
Note that these inequalities imply that if e - 1 the contract is not a
simple contract. Note also that these inequalities automatically imply that
truth- telling is preferred:
A A
U(b,b) - U(g,b) >
A A
U(g,g) - U(b,g) >
A A
For reference figure Al depicts U(a,g) and U(a,b) as functions of P A in the
a
case where A* - and e - 1. Note that
a
A A
U(a,g) > U(a,b) for all P* (A. 3)
As payment promised in the contract increases up to the level AT. , the
expected payoff to the depositor increases one-for-one. From AT. to AT ? it
increases less than one-for-one, since the depositor knows he will receive the
payment only in the good realization which happens with probability p .
Promised payments above AT^ are irrelevant, since the depositor knows he will
never receive them. Note also that there is a unique equilibrium value of
the banker's response a, except when the contracted repayment equals AT. or
AT_ . In this case, the banker is indifferent among absconding, not absconding,
and any randomization of those two responses. In this case U is a
correspondence, where the particular value depends on the choice of banker's
strategy in the equilibrium.
FIGURE A.l ABOUT HERE
Proof of Theorem 1: The claim that an optimal contract must conform to one of
the four cases listed in the theorem is equivalent to the following claims:
a: If P < AT, in an optimal contract, then A - 0.
a ~ 1 r a
b: If the optimal contract is a compound contract, then
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A - and P G (AT. .AT,,] .
g g 1 2
c: If Che optimal contract has e - 1, then P > P .
g b
Claim a is fairly immediate: If a contract has liquidation with a
promised price less than or equal to AT., it is obviously suboptimal. The
depositor can be guaranteed the same amount without liquidation, since the
banker will never desire to abscond. And if there is no liquidation, the
banker's profits are greater.
Most of claim b is derived from the following lemma:
Lemma
:
If an optimal feasible contract has e - 1, then A - 0, and
g
P
g
e (AT
1
,
AT
2
].
Proof: If A - 1, then the return the depositor receives if he says g is
independent of the true signal. If A - but P is not in the specified
O D
interval, then the return is also independent of the signal (see figure Al) .
In either case, that is,
U(g,b) - U(g,g).
But by the incentive conditions (A.l) - (A. 2), this implies
A A
U(b,b) > U(b,g)
contradicting (A. 3).
Claim c follows by noting first that P, is certainly less than AT- (if it
is equal to or greater than AT 9 , then there is a lower price for which all
incentive constraints are satisfied for the depositor, and which gives greater
profits to the banker). If this is the case, (A.l) implies P < P . (Again,
this can be verified in figure Al).
The final step in demonstrating claim b is to verify that any feasible
compound contract in which P - AT. is dominated by a simple contract with P
g 1 g
less than or equal to AT. .
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Proof of Theorem 2
;
If S < AT. it is immediate that the optimal contract is a simple
non- liquidating contract. Such a contract entails no social waste, since the
required payback is so low that the banker never has an incentive to abscond.
Therefore, assume S > AT..
It is straightforward to show that whenever a contract is feasible and
optimal, the depositor receives a return equal to his outside return plus
compensation for any investment he has made. If the nonliquidation contract
is chosen, then profits are
\ (p T + (1-p )(1-A)T. ) + (1-A) (p, T_ + (1-p, )(1-A)T_) - S. (A. 4a)g2 g 1 b2 b 1
If the simple liquidation contract is chosen, then profits are
A (1-L) (p T_ + (1-p )T. ) + (1-A) (1-L) (p T_ + (1-p )T.) - S (A. 4b)g2 gl b2 bl
If the nuisance contract is chosen then profits are
A (p T 4- (1-p )(1-A)T. ) + (1-A) (p T. + (1-p, )T.) - S - I (A. 4c)g2 g 1 b2 bl
If the demandable debt contract is chosen, then profits are
A (p T- + (1-p )(1-A)T. ) + (1-A) (p (l-L)T. + (1-p ) (l-L)T. ) - S - I (A.4d)g2gl b2b
Profits in a nuisance contract are greater than profits in a
demandable debt contract. If
p
g
> (A-L) T
x
/ [(A-L)T
X
+L T
2
] > p
fe
,
(A. 5)
then the demandable debt contract dominates any simple contract for I
sufficiently small.
Assuming (A. 5), the optimal contract is the nuisance contract if there
exists an incentive compatible one which yields the depositor a return equal
to S + I . If there exists no such contract, the optimal contract is a
demandable debt contract if there exists an incentive compatible one which
yields the depositor a return equal to S + I . If neither of these contracts
exist, the optimal contract is a simple contract if one is feasible.
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In any feasible complex contract, the return to the depositor must exceed
S + I:
A P p + (1-A) P, > S + I. (A. 6)
g g b
A nuisance contract satisfying Theorem 1 (one with A^ = A = and P fe not
pqual to P ) exists if and only if there are a pair of payments Pb and P
satisfying restriction (c) of Theorem 1, (A. 6), and the incentive
compatibility restrictions (A.l) and (A. 2). (The last two reduce to)
(A. 7)
(A. 8)
The following five inequalities are necessary and sufficient for the existence
of such a P and P,
? p > P. + I/A
g g b
PK > P ff PK + I/U-A)b g b
g "b
S+I < A AT- p + (1-A) AT..
2 e 1
S+I < AT, (1 + A -2 )
1 Pu
!s_L
"b
L - J
S+I < AT- p
2 g
g 'b
I
P„"Pk
g b
1-A
T^r } * AT 2
^ — > ^ AT i
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Y (A. 9)
For each I sufficiently small, there exists S* > AT^ such that these
inequalities are satisfied by all S less than S*. In the interval (A^ , S*]
the nuisance contract is optimal.
The demandable debt contract is feasible if there exist payments P and
P, satisfying (A.l) and (A. 2), condition (d) of theorem 1, (A. 6), and the
b
feasibility restriction that P, < M. Necessary and sufficient conditions for
such payments to exist are
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S+I < A AT. p + (1-A) M
2 g
V Pb P zS+I < M (1 + A -a—-) - A -a —
(a) I
pb
1-A
S+ I < AT p -=^r"l
2 g A
p • p. A 1-A - 2
g b
ttt ( Is + -tit > s HP -p, A 1-A
g b
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(A. 10)
Note chat these conditions are identical to the five conditions in (A. 9) with
M substituted for AT.. . For I sufficiently small, the conditions are
satisfied by all S less than or equal to some critical value S** , where S** >
S*. In the interval (S*,S**] demandable debt is the optimal contract.
Provided that
p
g
> M / AT
2
> pb
for I sufficiently small,
(A. 11)
S** - A AT. p + (1-A) M - I,
2 g
which exceeds the maximum possible payout to the depositor under any simple
contract. Thus for required returns beyond S**, no contract is feasible.
Thus the theorem is proved provided that the signal is sufficiently
accurate in the sense that inequalities (A. 5) and (A. 11) hold and provided
that I is small enough -- that is, if it satisfies the following eight
requirements: Expression (A.4d) exceeds (A. 4a) and (A. 4b); inequalities
(A.9d) and (A.9e) hold; the right sides of (A. 9b) and (A. 9c) exceed AT ; the
right sides of (A. 10b) and (A. 10c) exceed the right side of (A. 10a). Given
(A. 5) and (A. 11), these eight inequalities hold strictly for I - 0; therefore
they hold in an interval of I small but positive.
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Proof of Theorem 3
:
We begin by determining Che optimal contract in general.
Lemma: The optimal contract in general involves three regions. For high
values of N, the contract mandates liquidation. For intermediate values of N
,
liquidation is not mandated, but aggregate payment is set sufficiently low
that absconding never occurs. For low values of N, payment is sec
sufficiently high that absconding takes place in low productivity outcomes.
Proof: In this proof we explicitly include the possibility of randomized
outcomes for various realizations of N. Recall that A is the indicator
variable for a liquidation and a is the indicator variable for absconding. Let
N , N , N be any triple of integers t such that.
a A o
Pr{A - 1|N A ) >1 A
Pr{a - 1, A - 0|N } >
1 a
Pr{a - 1 1 N ) and Pr(A =- 1 N ) > .
(Thus, N is an N for which liquidation can occur, N is an N for whichv A M a
absconding can occur, N is an N for which absconding does not occur and for
which liquidation need not occur) . Let
X be a subset of the event (A - 1 n N - N )
A A
X be a subset of the event (A - n N - N )
a a
X be a subset of the event {A - n N - N }
o o
each with identical probability e, and independent of T. Suppose NA < Nq .
Then by reversing behavior on X and X (i.e. setting A - 0,a - on X and A
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- 1 on X and reversing Che payoffs between the two), we do not affect the
distribution of aggregate payoffs to the depositors, but since the good
outcome is more likely for N we increase the expectation of the banker'sJ
o
profits
.
Suppose N < N . Then the distribution of T.lN stochastically dominates therr
o a 1 ' o J
distribution T.lN . Reverse the payoffs on X and X and let a be determined
l ' a
r J a o
by the incentive compatibility condition. This change reduces the likelihood
of absconding; it increases both depositors' expected payments and the
banker's profits.
If liquidation occurs, P can be no greater than
MY + (Z-Y)S
If absconding occurs with zero probability, P can be no greater than
AT + (Z-Y)S
If absconding occurs with less than probability 1, P can be no greater
than
AT
2
+ (Z-Y)S
Next we show that in each of the three regions described in the previous
lemma, these maximal payoffs are binding. It is clear that for a maximum,
constraint (3.6) is binding. If S > AT., the total payoff to depositors must
be greater than AT., in some state, and this implies that either liquidation or
the possibility of absconding must have positive probability in some
state. Both liquidation and the possibility of absconding reduce social
benefits. In other words, for a given required aggregate expected payment to
the depositors, profits are maximized by making the region of no liquidation
and no absconding (the intermediate region described in the lemma) as large as
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possible. If in some state the payoff is not at its maximum, then by
increasing the payoff to the maximum in that state we could expand the
intermediate region.
Next we determine the boundaries of the three regions. In our
calculations we will treat the variable N as if it had a continuous
distribution. The calculation with N a discrete random variable is analogous
and the resultant conditions are identical, but the complete description in
that case consumes considerable notation and is therefore omitted.
Let F(N) be the distribution of N, and let p(N) be the probability that
T. - T„ conditional on N bad realizations. Given the results so far, the
1 2
choice of an optimal contract can be reduced to a choice of two numbers, N
and N, to maximize
J*Q
- [p(N) T
2
+ (l-p(N)) (1-A) T
]_]
dF(N)
+ JN
N [p(N)T
2
+ (l-p(N)) T
1
] dF(N)
+
J"N
K ((1-L) p(N) T
2
+ (1-L) (l-p(N)) T
x
] dF(N)
(A2.0)
subject to
f^ p(N) AT-Y dF(N) + J* N AT Y dF(N) + J"^K MY dF(N) > YS + KI (A2.1)
and
N < N (A2.2)
The maximand is basically the sum of the firm profits and the expected
payments to the depositors. Constraint (A2.1) is essentially a transformation
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of the aggregate participation constraint; the righthand side is a
transformation of the aggregate reservation payment for all depositors.
Define p - p(N) and p - p(N). Then the first order conditions for this
maximization problem are as below:
[pT
2
+ (1-p) T
1
]
- [p (1-L) T
2
+ (1-p) (1-L) T
1
] - a [M - AT^ =
-[p T
2
+ (1-p) T
l
] + [p T
2
+ (l-p)(l-A) T
1
] - a (AT^ -pAT
2
) =
where p < p and a is the Lagrange multiplier attached to constraint (A2.1).
As the right side increases from AT.Y in constraint (A2.1), a increases from
zero, p rises, and p falls -- in other words, the region in which there is no
absconding and no liquidation shrinks. Finally, there is a critical level such
that for a greater than the critical level constraint (A2.2) becomes binding.
From this point, the solution is defined by constraints (A2.1) and (A2.2)
holding with equality. For YS + KI above this level, the middle region is
degenerate, and the contract takes the form described in the text. When the
middle region is degenerate the right side of (A2.2) is calculated from the
following formula
W(N) - J - p(N) AT 2Y dF(N) + ^ MY dF(N)
where N is the boundary between the remaining two regions.
The remaining portion of the proof demonstrates that given LT, < AT , the
set of values U - YS + KI for which the optimum has a degenerate middle
region is a closed interval [W, U] with W < W.
The lower end of the interval is found as follows: Combine the above
first order conditions as follows:
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L(T 'p+ T.(l-p)) M - AT
= = (A2.3)
AT
X
pAT
2
- AT
X
Solve wnen p - p for the unique positive root. (Call it p*) . Then
W - W(N* (p*))
Provided LT- < AT
1
,
as W increases beyond the critical point, the optimum
is achieved by reducing the region in which liquidation occurs and increasing
the region in which absconding becomes a possibility. In other words, as W
increases it takes more and more individuals to call for a liquidation.
The upper end of the interval is found by determining the maximum
feasible amount for W(N) . The maximum occurs at N (M/AT_). By using the
equation (A2.3) it is possible to verify that
p* > M/AT
2
Finally, we note that S as described in the text is equal to W/Y. If S
exceeds this amount, no matter how small I is there is no way to pay the
depositors the required amount in aggregate.
Proof of Theorem 4
A
Given the payoff structure we can explicitly write EU(g,b) as follows:
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EU(g.b) - p.
N
[ Pr{N|T,
S(Z-Y) - NR
Z-N
AT2Y[Pr(N|T
2
):
YM
N-0 N-0
E Pr(N ' T 2 } Z-N
N-N+l
+ d-Pb ) [ Pr(N|T 1 )
S(Z-Y) - NR
Z-N
N-0
K
YM
+ [ Pr,N l T l''Z-N
N-N+l
Where Pr{N|T.) is the probability of N individuals out of K receiving
bad signals conditional on the productivity draw being T. and individual 1
already having received a bad signal. (Recall that p, is the probability of
T 9 conditional on an individual's observing a bad realization of the signal.)
From the incentive conditions we know that for sufficiently small I, the
structure satisfies the conditions if and only if we can find Z and R such
that
EU(g.b) - R
S > R
By combinining these two conditions with the formula for EU(g,b) , and
simplifying the expressions we see that the following condition is equivalent:
E Pr(N l blFN
N-0
> AT ,
N
[Pr(N|T
2
|Aj
N-0
+ M
I
Pr
'
N
l
b
'z^N
N-N+l
where Pr(Nlb) - p u Pr(N|T ) + ( l-p u ) Pr { N | T.
}
b I b 1
If Z is very large, this inequality can be approximated by
S > AT Pr (T and N<Njb) + MPr(N>N|b)
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(Note also Chat Z must be greater than N and greater than Y + RK/S so that
all payments specified for all individuals are non negative in our contract.)
It remains only to show that for S - S, calculated at the end of the
previous proof, this strict inequality holds. But using the same
A
approximation for large Z, the definition of S implies that
S > AT Pr(T and N < N) + M Pr{N > N}
It is therefore sufficient to demonstrate that
AT
2
Pr(T and N < N |g) + M Pr{N > N|g)
> AT Pr{T and N < N |b) + M Pr{N > N|b
Given that AT_ > M, we only need to demonstrate that
Pr{T |N< N, b} < Pr(T
2
|N< N, g}
which in turn is equivalent to
Pr{N < N - 1 | T
2
) Pr{b|T
2
) Pr{N < N • 1 | T^ Pr(b|T 1 >
?r{N < N | T
2
) Pr{b|T
2
) Pr{N < N | T^ Pr{b|T
1
Using the Poisson distribution, the ratio in the above inequality for a given
T. can be approximated by
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N - 1
I f(x; M )
x -
"l
I f(x; fi L )
where
f(x, n) - \x e M / x!
For N sufficiently large, this quantity is decreasing in \i. From the
previous theorem, increases in S increase the cutoff level of N. It is
therefore only necessary to determine that N can be sufficiently large without
rendering the contract infeasible, that is, without allowing the quantity p(N)
to fall below M/AT,. . Direct calculation reveals that if N satisfies che
following inequality, then the contract remains feasible:
M
-0*1-/0 1-7
(/x
7/M,)- > e
AT
2
- M 7
By setting 7, the probability of the good outcome, sufficiently large, we can
make the maximum feasible N arbitrarily large, thereby guaranteeing that the
incentive constraint is satisfied without the contract becoming infeasible.
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NOTES
Financing through stocks and bonds, commercial paper, or longer-term bank
liabilities was less important historically. Until recently, few firms had
access to centralized markets in stocks or bonds, while commercial paper
issues typically have been limited to the financing of trade or the short-term
working-capital needs of only the most reputable enterprises.
2
Cone (1983) shows that, in a world of full information, the risk of
depositor liquidation under demandable debt is absent provided that financial
intermediaries are maturity-matched.
*
3
A detailed treatment of the rationale, technology and costs of systemic
suspension of convertibility are beyond the scope of our paper. Although
there is much interest in the role of demandable debt during banking crises,
it seems important to us first to understand the role of demandable debt
during normal periods of financial operation, and only afterward to examine
behavior in exceptional periods in which demandable debt provisions were
suspended.
We view suspension of convertibility as a relatively cumbersome
alternative solution to the agency problem inherent in banking, as bankers,
legislators and jurists susbstituted for the normal bank monitoring we model
in this paper as occuring via demandable debt contracting. Our framework is
perhaps best viewed as an explanation of the role of demandable debt in
imposing "market discipline" on the behavior of banks during non-panic times.
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4
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) gives a concise but useful review of these
approaches
.
Fundamental papers which utilize this approach are by Bryant (1980), Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), and Jacklin (1987). A major focus of Jacklin's work is
the extent to which traded assets can substitute for non- traded bank deposits.
In Jacklin (1988) the instruments considered are shares whose dividend depends
on the market price of the asset. Our focus is on an era in which centralized
markets for most assets are non-existent (presumably due to prohibitive
information and transactions costs) , so that the possibility of such
instruments does not arise.
The authorities sometimes gave noteholders of failed banks early access to
bank assets by selling off bank bond holdings, but most deraandable debt
(including demand deposits) was not redeemable until court-appointed receivers
and courts could value all assets and settle on a plan for distributing them
among liability holders. For a model emphasizing the costs to depositors of
delay in liquidation, see Engineer (1987).
See Calomiris and Schweikart (1988).
o
Smead (1928). For discussions of the role of fraud in earlier eras see
Golembe and Warburton (1958), Calomiris and Schweikart (1988), and Bentson and
Kaufman (1986). Data on national bank failures, by cause, can be found in the
Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1920, pp. 56-79. On the
importance of fraud in more recent bank failures, see Comptroller of the
Currency (1988).
46
q
Nicholas (1907), p. 26, dismisses the importance of withdrawals by small
depositors in causing bank liquidation. He writes, "If a bank is actually in
bad shape there is far more likelihood of its initial condition being
discovered by other banking institutions than by the individual depositors of
the bank. . .A run is sometimes started in this manner... and continues until it
has practically wiped out the reserves of the suspected institution, the
ordinary depositors receiving their first information regarding the position
of the bank when that institution is finally forced to close its doors and
formally apply for a receiver." This discussion makes important points about
bank runs which appear in our model below: Some depositors are informed while
others are not. Only runs by informed depositors end in liquidation.
Informed depositors are able to exercise their withdrawal option before
uninformed depositors are able to observe the bank's difficulty (or the run).
This point is emphasized by Diamond (1984) and Bernanke and Gertler (1987).
Diamond's solution to the delegated-monitoring problem of financial
intermediation relies on two assumptions that are absent in our framework: the
existence of an ex post non-pecuniary penalty that can be imposed on the
banker, and the ability of the banker to construct a riskless portfolio
through diversification. The second assumption permits enforcement of the
penalty even if cheating is costly to observe directly, whenever the banker
fails to meet his obligations. Townsend (1979) notes that in circumstances
where only one -party has access to information, debt contracts - i.e.,
contracts not contingent on the private information will often be the only
feasible alternative. For an overview of the relation between agency costs
and the structure of financial contracts see Fama (1988).
47
In our framework, the structure is sufficently simple that it is impossible
for institutions to arise in which reputation solves the incentive
compatibility problem. In our view, this is the correct first step. The
viability of a reputation equilibrium depends crucially on the comparison of
the current gain from cheating and the prospective future loss of reputation
capital. When the reputation guarantees against, for example, the production
of inferior quality goods, it seems reasonable to predict that reputations may
be effective, since the gains from cheating are comparatively small. Bankers,
however, receive a large quantity of mobile liquid wealth from depositors in
advance of beginning loan operations. The temptations to a bank manager from
absconding with the gold may be great, making it particularly difficult to
maintain a reputation equilibrium. The peculiar vulnerability of financial
institutions to damage of reputations is consistent with the concern expressed
by bankers to maintain reputations for an extraordinary degree of probity and
their emphasis on concomitant signals -- ornate, expensive edifices and the
like.
12
Thus, this framework captures an important feature of historical banking:
Some depositors (including, for example, other banks) monitored banks'
prospects and activities closely, while others deposited funds without
investing resources in following the fortunes of the bank.
13
See Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) for a distinction beteen information
based runs and pure panics.
14
Their model also provides for exogenous liquidity demands and for the
possibility of inferring others' information by watching the length of lines
at the banks.
48
In our model, informed depositors are allowed to benefit from exercising a
put option based on the information they receive. They can opt to convert
their debt into goods and receive a higher payoff than the uninformed
depositors. However, unlike the usual "inside- trading" scenario, the
uninformed depositors also benefit at the expense of the bank. While the
uninformed depositors receive a lower payoff than the informed depositors,
they benefit because the bank is prevented from cheating. In the usual
scenario (for example, Kyle, 1981), the uninformed either lose or the informed
cannot successfully earn a return on their information production because of
free riding, as in Grossman-Stiglitz (1980). We thank an anonymous
referee for suggesting this comparison to us.
See Villamil (1988), Jacklin (1988), Williamson (1988), and Gorton and
Pennacchi (1988) for various approaches to combining the liquidity and
incentive arguments.
The concentration of bank fraud during times of regional or national economic
decline is pronounced in national bank failure data. See the Annual Report of
the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, 1920, pp. 56-79.
18
There are several ways we can approach the question of the maximum to be paid
once the court has control. For simplicity we assume M does not very with the
realization of T. . One argument is that the value of the firm might be
determined by the court, but at a very high cost. In this case, the best the
court can do is to give the depositor the minimum value in the support of the
distribution. In this case M - (l-L)T-. Another approach would be to assume
that the court physically hands the assets over to the depositor -- who then
receives whatever they are worth. In this case, M would be the expected value
of the assets conditional on any signal the depositor has drawn.
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19
Actual liquidation costs in the United States varied historically,
depending on time, location and bank size, but seem to have been small
relative to potential social losses from absconding, as our model assumes.
Bankruptcy expenses averaged between three and six percent of total
collections for national banks between 1872 and 1904 (Gendreau and Prince,
1986).
20
In the single depositor case, the assumption that the signal takes only two
values is not restrictive. In fact, the multi depositor model of the
subsequent section can be reinterpreted as a single depositor model with
multivalued signals.
21
As it stands, the specification of the contract is incomplete in two
technical respects. First the specification of the outcome should include a
specification of the banker's response -- i.e. whether he chooses to abscond
A
- - as a function of the announcement a and of the realization T.. However in
l
almost all contracts the banker's response is easily discerned: He absconds if
P
A
> AT. and does not abscond if P A< AT.. Only in the case of indifference
a i a x
would it be necessary to specify his response in detail.
Secondly the contract does not include the possibility of randomized
outcomes. These can be shown never to dominate deterministic outcomes.
22
This assumption is natural given that we regard the project as requiring the
banker's expertise, but the reserves as invested in publicly available
technologies. ;
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23
An alternative assumption is that if the banker absconds, he takes the
entirety of the reserves as well. The assumption in the text is natural if we
regard absconding as occuring by siphoning a project into a less desirable
project whose returns accrue directly to the banker. The assumption in this
footnote is natural if we regard absconding as occuring when the banker piles
the loot into the stagecoach and heads out of town.
24
This is the simplest structure of supply of signals; it can be generalized.
Alternatively, the cost of investing in a signal can be determined in a
general equilibrium model. Since these extensions are beyond the scope of our
interests we omit them.
25
It will be clear that as long as the cost of investing in the signal is
sufficiently low, it is optimal to have all individuals with cost I make the
investment
.
26
If exactly N announce bad signals, the optimal contract has a randomization
between liquidation and non liquidation. We omit the details.
The appendix shows that for values of S below this range, it will be
useful to have two thresholds rather than one. For a range of values of bad
signals received, it will be optimal to reduce the promised payment rather
than liquidate the bank. This is analogous to the nuisance contract discussed
before, and as before, it can be precluded by sufficiently high reservation
levels of return.
27
In a richer model, one could imagine banks choosing between holding reserves
and investing more in higher earning projects. In this model, reserves are
used exclusively for redistributing payouts between monitors and non-monitors
in an incentive compatible way.
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28
The constraints initially have two equalities that must be satisfied; however
given the fact that the total expected payments equal SZ + KI as they do
by construction of the demandable debt contract, one of the equations is
redundant: if the informed depositors are each receiving S+I , then the
uninformed are automatically receiving the remainder, or S per depositor
29
Historically, observed specie prices of bank notes published in bank note
"reporters" confirm the view that non-monitors faced little price uncertainty
for bank notes of banks that were open. Discounts on ante-bellum bank notes
convertible on demand into specie traded in the home city at par; in distant
locations the discounts for currencies mainly refelected the risk due to the
time it would take to reach the city of issue. Typically, one could know the
value of a bank's notes in New York by knowing the state in which the bank was
located. These discounts typically remained small (between 1/8 percent and 2
percent) and were not subject to much variation. For failed banks, bank note
discounts either were not quoted in bank note reporters or were subject to
extreme variations across banks in the same locale and over time. See
Calomiris and Schweikart (1988).
30
See Akerlof (1970) and Klein (1974).
31
For a summary of the events of the panic of 33 A.D. see A. W. Ferrin, "The
Business Panic of A.D. 33," Moody' s Magazine (August 1908), pp. 81-2.
32
See Calomiris and Schweikart (1988) and Cannon (1910).
33
See Gorton (1989) and Calomiris and Kahn (1988).
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